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Epistemology and conceptual resources for the development of 
 learning technologies 
 
Abstract 
 
The issues raised by the design and development of technologies to enhance learning 
has led to a demand for an appropriate language and form of conceptualisation. 
However we are insufficiently familiar with the way in which different types of 
mediated tool use occur, to develop the theoretical models needed for the 
development of this language and form of conceptualisation. In its absence a 
somewhat eclectic variety of concepts and research, such as the concept of affordance, 
are recruited in accounts of learning with new technologies. In looking briefly at the 
relevant area in philosophy this paper will consider whether or not the use of concepts 
such as affordance give adequate weight to social practice, meaning and knowledge in 
the design of educational technology. A fruitful source for work in this field which 
has not been sufficiently exploited is philosophy, particularly recent work in 
epistemology.  
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Introduction 
 
The use of new technologies in education would appear to offer a powerful alternative 
to traditional formal learning and what is normally characterized as the transmission 
mode of teaching. There are the possibilities that technologies open up for the 
presentation of materials in a variety of forms and the opportunities for working on 
materials rather than passively consuming them. However, the potential of technology 
to enhance learning can only be realised if it is based on a secure foundation of a 
robust understanding of learning, teaching and knowledge.  
 
It is important to stress that education, as it is understood in this paper, goes beyond 
the simple acquisition of information and certain capacities to follow rules or 
procedures, and involves the development of the capacity of judgment; the capacity 
not merely to respond passively to events but the ability to actively make decisions 
appropriate to a variety of contexts. 
 
Spelling out what a robust understanding of learning and knowledge entails is far 
from straightforward. Here just one difficulty can be noted, namely that the study of 
learning is not an established discipline as is the case for physics or chemistry. There 
is not an established paradigm of learning in Kuhn‟s sense of the term, that is to say 
there is no agreed framework of thought in which ideas are communicated and 
research is developed.  The emergence of the „learning sciences‟ in recent years is a 
significant attempt to draw together a disparate research field (Sawyer 2006). In many 
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ways this development has arisen as a result of the intensive introduction of new 
technologies into education. With the attempt to enhance learning via the use of 
technologies, the design of learning has become paramount, in turn demanding 
detailed attention to claims made and their presuppositions as well as to the possibility 
of generalising results.   
 
The lack of an established paradigm currently has the consequence that one term may 
have a variety of different meanings or an idea may be advanced in one area whilst 
having been rejected in another. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to this 
insufficiency; the way in which concepts common in the literature on learning-
technologies are inadequate for their intended purposes and are based on 
epistemological assumptions that are disputed.  This paper will aim to indicate how 
the study of some of the classical questions of philosophy make some contribution to 
overcoming these difficulties. 
 
As a way of accessing these questions, attention here is centred on the concept of 
affordance, in particular the function that it is called upon to perform in the 
theorisation and investigation of learning with technologies. It is argued that the 
concept gives insufficient weight to both knowledge and social practice (Alrechtsen, 
Andersen  Bodker and Pejterson 2001) and is regularly used in a form that fails to 
recognise what is distinctive about human learning. Here, it is not affordances as such 
that is of concern but as a concept that provides ready access to the issue of 
representation and meaning and therefore a way of raising broader questions 
concerning the nature of human learning. In turn this introduces issues which illustrate 
the importance of epistemology.  
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The concept of affordance itself has a technical meaning within ecological psychology 
but even within this well-defined area it is still the subject of debate and disagreement 
- what it involves is still being worked out (Stroffregen 2000). Nevertheless, the term 
has slipped into the vernacular of work dealing with what technologies can offer 
learners. At this point, questions arise illustrating just how much remains to be done 
to make our understanding of the nature of learning explicit. In philosophical terms 
making explicit means bringing into the open exactly what meaning is being carried 
by a term and what is being taken as given when claims and judgments are made. 
 
The term affordance is frequently used without any careful specification as to what it 
means (Boyle & Cook 2004; McGenere & Ho 2000). Although authors rely on the 
original usage of the concept in the psychology of perception, the meaning is 
broadened when applied to education. For example in Conole and Dyke‟s discussion 
of the affordances of information and communications technologies in relation to 
education the following claims are made: “Exposure to the experience of others is a 
key ingredient to effective learning and a potential affordance of ICT” and “[a]nother 
affordance of ICT is the potential for multi-modal and multi-linear approaches to 
learning” (Conole & Dyke, 2004, p.119). Both of these claims carry far more than 
their authors might have intended. Rather than speaking in general terms of how ICT 
may offer or afford opportunities when used within carefully designed educational 
contexts, the authors prefer the use of the technical noun „affordance‟, a word made 
up by Gibson to communicate the possibility of direct perception of meaning. This 
alters the focus of attention and contributes to the view that technologies can offer 
educational advantages independently of the individuals engaging with them for 
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specific purposes. In a recent article on ICT and Science Education, Webb refers to 
the origin of the term affordances in Gibson‟s theory of the ecology of perception 
saying: 
 
Just as in an ecological system in which affordances for a 
particular organism depend upon the potential interaction 
between organisms and the environment and interactions with 
other organisms, so in an ICT-supported learning environment 
affordances are provided by interactions between hardware, 
software, other resources, teachers and other students.  
(Webb, 2005, p. 707) 
 
Again slippage in the use of the term while making use of Gibson‟s concept to refer to 
the whole learning environment, detracts from crucial educational issues. For 
example, to what extent is it possible to speak of “direct perception” when learning is 
the issue under consideration? The leap from ideas originating in perceptual 
psychology linking perception and action in a non-cognitive relation of organism and 
environment to an educational context dependent on interactions between humans, is 
at the very least questionable. Moreover, the idea of direct perception is controversial 
within psychology. Gregory has long argued, in contrast to Gibson, that perception 
involves predicative hypotheses, that knowledge is a prerequisite for perception and 
that experience is only indirectly related to external reality (Gregory 1997, 1998). 
Laurillard, Stratfold, Luckin, Plowman & Taylor (2000) note that the term affordance 
has common currency for „describing characteristics of the learning process‟. They 
comment approvingly that although the word is borrowed from the psychology of 
perception: „it expresses very well the fact that there is an internal relation between 
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the perceiver and the perceived‟.  However, they do attempt to delimit how the term 
might be applied: „We may like to think that a lecture affords learning, but the only 
affordances we can be sure of are those constituting its definition - it is a vocal 
presentation, and thereby at least affords listening‟ (Laurillard et al 2000, p. 3). 
Following Gibson, it might be more accurate to say that all that the lecture involves 
(by way of affordance) is a cacophony of sound albeit expressive sound. Listening 
involves an intelligent engagement on the part of the audience.  
 
Had the term affordance been made explicit (i.e. its connection to other concepts been 
made clear), as for example the idea of a particle has been made explicit, this type of 
inconsistency would not arise. Whether it matters that the term is not made explicit 
depends upon what weight of argument is being carried by the term or, more 
importantly, whether the use of the term forecloses areas requiring further 
investigation. The noun “affordance” carries a greater weight of meaning, when 
incorporated into accounts of technology-enhanced learning, than the verb “afford”. 
Where it is argued that the affordances of educational technologies have educational 
benefits, the concept of affordance really needs to be spelled out in some detail. In the 
complex case of education, the derivation of the noun affordance, where it is taken to 
mean that an object or technical situation can be immediately grasped, is quite 
misleading. Webb (2005) includes the disposition of the student as a factor relevant to 
the effect of an affordance but it is precisely the disposition of the student that the 
whole concept of affordance is avoiding when it is transferred from the realm of 
animals and environment to human learning. 
 
A particular epistemology, that is a particular set of ideas about what it is to know, 
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how knowing occurs and how knowledge is possible, underpins the approach to 
learning enhanced by new technologies here. An aspect of this epistemology which 
has particular importance concerns both representation and meaning. In this paper I 
take up some of the questions concerning meaning by looking at those streams of 
contemporary philosophy which have instigated a radical reopening of the question of 
Mind and World.  It turns out that this reconsideration parallels the work of Vygotsky 
(Bakhurst 1997) and through Vygotsky a connection to education is forged. 
 
Affordance and Meaning 
 The term affordance was coined by James Gibson who developed the concept as 
a core element of his theory of the ecology of perception. He distinguishes the noun 
affordance from the verb to afford saying “I mean by it something that refers to both 
the environment and animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the 
complementarity of the animal and environment” (Gibson, 1986, p. 127). His theory 
of ecological psychology addressed what he saw as the inadequacy of accounts both 
in mentalist terms, emphasising the subjective constitution of concepts, and in 
behaviourist terms emphasising habits. He was concerned to provide a naturalistic 
account of animal-environment reciprocity drawing particular attention to the way in 
which our bodily activity is constrained by ecological position. As an example of 
what he meant by affordance he wrote of:  
 
an elongated object, especially if weighted at one end and 
graspable at the other affords hitting or hammering (a club).  A 
pointed object affords piercing (a spear, and arrow, and awl, or 
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a needle)…users of such tools must keep within certain limits 
of manipulation, since they themselves may be cut or pierced.   
(Gibson, 1986, pp.40-41) 
 
The idea that an organism‟s responses to an environment could operate without 
requiring a higher level of cognitive awareness, is central to the idea that meaning is 
contained within the environment itself or by virtue of the relation existing between 
the organism to its environment (direct perception). The complexity of what is 
involved here, for the application of the concept in education, pivots on how we 
understand the process of human perception and its relation to meaning.  Although 
„meaning‟, if we can speak about the term in this physical sense, would arise directly 
due to the organism/environment relation, Jones argues that Gibson struggles with the 
issue of meaningful perceptions, arguing that at points in his work Gibson was in fact 
arguing that meaning could be inherent in an object (Jones 2003). Distinguishing his 
own view from that of Koffka‟s, Gibson argues that whereas in Koffka‟s view the 
„value of something was assumed to change as the need of the observer changed‟ his 
own concept affordance had a crucial difference: 
 
The affordance of something does not change as the need of the 
observer changes. The observer may or may not perceive or 
attend to the affordance, according to his needs but the 
affordance, being invariant is always there to be perceived. 
(Gibson, 1986, p.139) 
  
 The issue of value and hence meaning is the crux of the matter; what meaning is and 
how it may be understood in relation to thought, learning and knowledge. This cannot 
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but involve a consideration of the distinctive relation of humans to the world that they 
inhabit and the extent to which that relation is one characteristic of an animal or a 
human nature. If it is the case that meaning can be conveyed directly to our senses by 
virtue of a co-evolved relation with an environment then the design and development 
of technology-enhanced learning is quite a different matter than if it is the case that 
humans develop intellect, not though a cumulative build up of sense data but instead, 
as Vygotsky proposed, by enculturation into a humanized environment.  Education, a 
peculiarly higher form of behaviour, cannot be adequately understood by starting 
from the standpoint of an empiricist epistemology. Unlike animals which evolve 
human beings also develop.  And in this process of development, through which 
whole new needs and capacities are created including new ways of thinking about the 
world, acting in it and on it, education plays a crucial role. It is only when it is 
conceived in the most wide of contexts that its importance can be fully appreciated.  
The issues involved in articulating the distinctive character of human knowing and of 
knowledge go beyond the reach of this article. However, in so far as philosophical 
work raises questions concerning the use of the concept of affordance within social 
practices, just one small aspect will be considered below; the difference between 
mechanical and human responsiveness to the world. 
 
 The concept of affordance, in the sense of conveying meaning directly, was taken up 
and developed further by Donald Norman (1988) in his book The Psychology of 
Everyday Things. A major theme of his book „was the attempt to understand how we 
manage in a world of tens of thousands of objects, many of which we would 
encounter only once‟ and Norman‟s response to the question was „that the required 
information was in the world: the appearance of the device [my emphasis] could 
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provide the critical clues for its operation‟ (Norman, D.1999, p. 38). Norman‟s work 
played an important role in the uptake of the concept of affordance although the 
concept was used in a way that Norman had not originally intended. The benefits of a 
further means for defining design criteria detracted from a better appreciation of what 
was really involved in the concept. The concept has currency in work concerned with 
the interaction between humans and technologies and, as such, figures in 
consideration of how new technologies can be used to enhance learning. 
 
In Gibson‟s view objects disclose themselves directly to the perceiving subject since 
he conceives information as a direct relation between an organism and its 
environment. Potentially this is a very powerful argument, as it cuts through problems 
concerning representation and the like and makes perception the remit of a direct and 
straightforward relation. However, it is open to the criticism that its directness closes 
off the space for meaning and effectually rejects the whole issue of interpretation. 
Gibson‟s argument has obvious strengths. It is widely used by designers (e.g. in 
calculating the optimum tread of a step required for a particular mode of climbing) 
however, it is not clear that these strengths qualify it to be applied to education. The 
reason for this is it leaves no space for a full conception of meaning. As an exponent 
of Gibson‟s ideas, Jones makes meaning follow from direct experience; „objects and 
events have inherent meaning which is detected and exploited by the animal without 
mental calculation‟ (Jones 2003, p.107) but this derivation of meaning directly from 
the sensual perception of objects is highly questionable. At least when used in relation 
to higher order processes such as education it requires the most careful application. 
For example in an earlier passage we saw that Laurillard et al said that lectures afford 
listening – exactly the same issue arises here. What lectures afford in the technical 
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sense is the hearing of sound, listening involves the translation of sound into 
meaningful statements and this relies not only on the sound and the organisms 
response but a receiver which is capable of making this construction. Such a 
capability requires the induction into culture and into the use of language i.e. it 
depends upon the social development of mind. 
 
The key question that arises in this context is whether or not meaning is specifically a 
human characteristic. A human‟s relation to its environment involves concept use, i.e. 
it is mediated. That is not to say that any one individual is necessarily aware of 
concepts in play as background to their responsiveness. However, it does mean that 
our contact with the world as humans rather than animals involves a different relation, 
one mediated by meaning (i.e. reasons). The philosopher Robert Brandom provides a 
helpful way of thinking about the issue of our distinctive relation to the world. He 
raises the question of how it would be possible to distinguish between a human and 
machine response if both could be conceived in terms of „differential responses‟ to an 
environment. For the purposes of the argument being developed here I will take the 
phrase „differential response‟ to be implicit in the idea of direct perception contained 
in the concept of affordance.  
 
 It is Gibson‟s claims that „the basic affordances of the environment are usually 
perceivable directly, without an excessive amount of learning‟ (Gibson, 1986, p. 143) 
that has proved highly influential. To the extent that technologies are self-revealing 
the concept of affordance has clearly got a crucial part to play in their design. 
However, questions remain of just how self-revealing technologies are in the context 
of their use in enhancing learning and of whether the concept of affordance is helpful 
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when it detracts from more fundamental issues as to what is involved in learning. It is 
generally appreciated that technology by itself is insufficient and that human 
intervention in the process of learning is essential. But this general recognition does 
not by itself resolve the problem of how the human and the technological should be 
combined. In the case of Gibson‟s original conception of affordance this problem is 
dealt with by the addition of motives and needs:  
 
affordances are properties taken with reference to the observer. 
They are neither physical or phenomenal. The notion of 
invariants that are related at one extreme to the motives and 
needs of an observer and at the other extreme to the substances 
and surfaces of the world provides a new approach to 
psychology. 
 
  (Gibson, 1986, p.143)  
 
 
 But as far as learning was concerned, he recognised that problems arose:  
 
If the affordances of a thing are perceived correctly, we say that 
it looks like what it is. But we must of course learn what things 
really are for example, that the innocent looking leaf is really a 
nettle or that the helpful sounding politician is really a 
demagogue. And this can be very difficult.  
 
(Gibson, 1986, p. 142)  
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 To repeat, the main point of the argument here is not the strengths and 
weaknesses of the concept of affordance as Gibson originally applied it to the matter 
of perception, but the problems that occur when it is used in a more reductive way as 
a component in accounts of learning. In this connection what is especially important is 
the issue of epistemology, of the carrying over from what for the sake of argument 
may be considered by some a relatively straightforward question of perception to the 
far more complex issue of learning. For example it is one thing to perceive that this 
object is for hammering. It is quite another to determine that this event is historical 
(E.H.Carr‟s What is History) or, to choose another example, where to decide the part 
played by judgment is in the practice of medicine. Although he may not have spelled 
it out in this way, Gibson‟s notion of affordances would seem to imply the idea that 
perception occurs through „mechanical‟ causation whereby the actual relation of the 
object to the senses of the subject determines information. For example, seeing and 
feeling an object that is heavy at one end communicates that what is felt and seen 
affords hammering, according to the position of the actor. Although at odds with 
Gibson‟s own claim for the epistemological basis of his work, the line of thinking 
originates in a categorical separation of mind and world. This separation, from the 
time of its formulation by Descartes in the seventeenth century, has defined the 
problem of knowledge - how can a mind totally apart from the world ever gain 
knowledge of it? A considerable amount of philosophic work since that time has been 
dedicated to resolving this problem. Outside philosophy and in the applied social 
sciences and psychology the difficulties posed by dualism have been less acute with 
the question of the validity of knowledge taking precedence over how it is constituted 
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in the first place and Cartesian dualism has been tacitly accepted in these fields of 
study. The proximity of learning to knowledge, that is the proximity of acquiring 
knowledge to what counts as knowledge in the first place, throws this acceptance into 
question and opens the way for the criticism of it within philosophy.  
 
 
Mind and World 
 
As a preface to considering philosophy that is pertinent to the question of what sort of 
conceptual resources we need for thinking about technologies and the enhancement of 
learning, it is helpful first to note some of what Vygotsky said about the development 
of mind.  Vygotsky dealt with the question of how a child learns language by 
introducing a social aspect to the development of mind. The problem of how it is 
possible to learn meaning without a cumulative building up of more and more 
complex words, is dealt with by understanding meaning to be a located in social 
practices which a child inhabits by default. The actions and utterances of a newborn 
are made meaningful, not by an original intention of the child, but by the meaning 
given to the utterances by other human beings. In this sense a newborn becomes 
human by his/her induction into the meanings and practices of the social group. The 
distinctive character of human beings is that contact with the world is not a matter of 
responsiveness to causes but to reasons. Meaning cannot be understood apart from the 
social practices that govern our responses to our environment. The human 
environment is not one of „first nature‟ but of „second nature‟ i.e. it is an environment 
made meaningful through the significance given to it by human activities. A child 
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inhabiting such a humanized environment ipso facto learns (everyday) meaning as an 
aspect of the activities of living with other human beings.  
 
Formal education plays a further and distinctive role, according to Vygotsky, by 
inducting learners into domains of meaning not part of everyday practices.  Social 
practices are not restricted to everyday experience but many of the characteristics of 
the knowledge domains (and the social practices underpinning them) that constitute 
formal education take a very different form. Vygotsky characterised this difference by 
distinguishing between scientific (abstract) and everyday concepts. The relevant point 
here is that the relation between experience and the world is not direct and in the case 
of domains of formal knowledge the relation may well be counterintuitive. The 
philosophical issues involved are not straightforward but what is of interest here is the 
extent to which epistemological presuppositions inform conceptions of how we come 
to know. In very general terms one such presupposition is that of dualism.  
 
 Turning now to the criticism of dualism: the first point to note is that this 
criticism has a long history. For example both Kant and Hegel devoted considerable 
attention to this issue. Here however attention is drawn to the work of contemporary 
philosophers who, working from within the analytic tradition, have called the 
categorical separation of Mind and World into question. The starting point here is 
Sellars‟ attack on what he termed „the myth of the given‟, that is the idea that we have 
direct contact with the world. For Sellars the concept of knowledge belongs in a 
normative context: that is to say it cannot be separated from making judgments and 
giving reasons as Sellars puts it; 
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In characterising an episode or a state as that of knowing, we 
are not giving a … description of that episode or state; we are 
placing it in the…space of reasons, of justifying and being able 
to justify what one says.  
 
(Sellars cited in McDowell 1996, p.5) 
 
 
The philosophy involved here is not easily accessible but this does not mean that it is 
not important. Our common sense understanding of saying that we know something is 
that we give a description of an event as the event impinges on our senses. However 
taking a step back from this apparently self-evident proposition it can be seen that the 
organization of words contained in our description relies upon a whole set of reasons 
informing each term in the description (i.e. each concept depends upon many other 
concepts for its meaning). This is counterintuitive, as we believe an utterance - 
particularly one as simple as the exclamation „Fire!‟ - to be nothing more than a 
straightforward response to a stimulus. However, when we look at the issue from the 
standpoint of Vygotsky or Brandom, this is not the case. If it were indeed the case, 
then the „description‟ we would give could be given by a parrot or a machine: i.e. it 
would not be a case of knowing but merely that of a response to a stimulus. The 
distinctive feature of human contact with the world is that perception has a conceptual 
dimension. Without this, we could understand our responsiveness to an environment 
as indistinguishable from a fire alarm or parrot which responds differentially to 
environmental forces (Brandom 2000).  
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To take further Brandom‟s illustration of differential responses to a fire: the 
distinctive feature of a thinking being is its responsiveness to reasons rather than to 
causes. For example, when human beings shout „Fire!‟ they understand something of 
what follows from the event of a fire (their response involves reasons as well as 
causes). They are aware of the dangers and of the actions that need to be taken, unlike 
a fire alarm which is merely responding differentially to smoke and heat. In other 
words, the human action consists not merely of registering alarm. If we were to apply 
Gibson‟s concept of affordances to such an event, the human cry, being a response to 
a fire, would be more or less identical to that of a fire alarm. Brandom‟s point is that 
what distinguishes the human form of knowing from the type of „knowing‟ we might 
ascribe to a machine is the same as Sellars‟ position that knowing for a human being, 
consists not merely in expressing a response but in knowing what follows from it, 
knowing the implications, or what Brandom calls the „giving and asking of reasons‟ 
(Brandom 2000). As Brandom puts it „even non-inferential reports must be 
inferentially articulated‟. To put this point in another form, the child using words 
having not yet acquired their precise meaning, may not know all of the reasons which 
support the application of a particular word.  Yet their use of the word is dependent 
upon those reasons, even if the child is not in a position yet to operate with the word 
in its full sense. Concept development continues throughout formal education. To 
learn something is to be inducted into the space of reasons in which the concepts 
constituting what is learnt function. 
 
To the extent that this proposition is crucial to the understanding of human intellect, 
so it must be equally vital for the understanding of learning:  
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One of the most important lessons we learn from Sellars's 
masterwork, Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind (as from the  
section on „Sense Certainty‟ in Hegel's Phenomenology), is the 
inferentialist one that even noninferential reports must be 
inferentially articulated. Without that requirement we cannot 
tell the difference between noninferential reporters and 
automatic machinery such as thermostats and photocells, which 
also have reliable dispositions to respond differentially to 
stimuli.  
 
(Brandom 2000, p.48)  
 
For Brandom the fact that the response is made by a human, that is to say by creatures 
who inhabit a world in which reasons are asked and given, the shout „Fire!‟ is always 
more than the blast of an alarm or the squawk of the parrot even when the person 
shouting is responding to the urgency and does not have in mind all the reasons for 
the exclamation. Reasons are always present for the response to have meaning in the 
first place. This point needs to be stressed, that living in the space of reasons, as the 
philosophers McDowell and Brandom have developed the idea, does not entail full 
consciousness of reasons all of the time. The space of reasons is the environment in 
which human beings live; it is the equivalent of Gibson‟s ecology. 
 
The difference between the understanding of knowledge from philosophers discussed 
here and Gibson‟s concept of affordance (as information) is apparent at once. To 
determine that this is a hammer, we not only have to sense it in use but also in what 
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McDowell, following Sellars, calls „the space of reasons‟ (McDowell, 1996). Animals 
can use stones as hammers but what they cannot do is make hammers specifically 
designed for the task. This requires holding a concept of hammer - putting hammering 
into the space of reasons, i.e. understanding it in all its aspects. McDowell‟s stresses 
the distinctive character of human contact with the world when he notes that 
receptivity (our basic intake) already involves the conceptual:  
 
though Sellars here speaks of knowledge in particular, that is 
just to stress one application of thought that a normative 
context is necessary for being in touch with the world at all, 
whether knowledgeably or not.  
 
(McDowell, 1996, p. xiv) 
 
 Combined with a Vygotskian account of learning these ideas of Sellars, 
McDowell and Brandom provide powerful resources for thinking about knowing as 
well as thinking about knowledge itself. The contrast with Gibson‟s ecology of 
perception is particularly sharp, since instead of suggesting a child enters the world 
experiencing an ecology of perception, rather, it is inducted into an already 
constituted space of reasons. The environment that humans inhabit is not the 
immediate sensual environment that Gibson claims but a mediated one, i.e. a world of 
second nature in the sense characterized above.  
 
According to this approach, our actions in the world are intrinsically normative; i.e. 
when we attend to something it has significance for us and that significance is part of 
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our involvement with it in the context of social practice of which other humans are 
party.  
 
 Every theory of education necessarily has epistemological foundations but, as 
these are rarely spelt out, exploring their significance is far from a straightforward 
exercise. But if anything, developing a theory of education on the basis of an 
epistemology which was developed without education in mind is an ever difficult 
task.  However, simply to insist that such a theory can be developed is another matter 
and this is as far as the claims made here go, that as the work of philosophers like 
Sellars, McDowell and Brandom have compelling implications for understanding the 
nature of knowledge so they offer grounds for conceptualising innovative ways of 
communicating it.  As this is occurring at exactly the same time as the practice of 
communicating technology is undergoing radical transformation, an unexpected but 
interesting possibility of convergence arises between the practical concerns of those 
who design the technology which is to bring about this transformation and the most 
abstract of all philosophic enquiries – what is knowledge and how do we know it? 
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